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From Aesthetic to Epistemic Structures and 
back: Complex Dynamics between Art and 
Science
Fausto Fraisopi
Abstract. We often forget that art and science are not dissociated, nor indeed antago-
nistic, but rather allow a creative interplay to emerge from which arises the generation 
of new forms of knowledge (Miller [1995]: 190). According to Parkinson, “the analogy 
between the new painting and the new physics consists in that elements formerly held 
as cognitive or conceptual a-prioris enter as constitutive factors in the very structure of 
the edifices of art and science” (Parkinson [2008]: 161). How exactly does it work? If 
for us nowadays it’s relatively easy to think of the mimetic moment of art as a prelude 
to geometry, it is not so trivial to claim how higher-order representational symbolic 
epistemic structures (h.o.r.s.e.s.) arise from the lifeworld, or simply how both interact 
together. The aim of this paper is to stake out the complexity of processes going from 
the lifeworld and, before that, from the life of pictorial language, to h.o.r.s.e.s., in order 
to apply this model to further enquiries. In the first part, we will reactivate the Kantian 
interdependence between aesthetics and epistemology via the intersubjective dimen-
sion, in order to understand how the shaping of forms and the figuring-out patterns 
remain an essential component of any epistemic structure as such. In the second part, 
moving from Hacking, Husserl and Foucault, we will look into the way in which the 
evidence of symbolic structures can be maintained even alongside a genetic concep-
tion of science. Art plays an essential role in such a conception, in that it opens new 
horizons of figurativity in which new shapes can arise and new kinds of objectivities 
(Gegenständlichkeiten) can be accepted as belonging to our epistemic experience of 
the world.  
Keywords. Symbolic Structures, Aesthetic Dimension, History of Science, Kant.
There is a strong interdependence 
between aesthetic and epistemological problems. 
E. Garroni
We often forget that art and science are not dissociated, nor 
indeed antagonistic, but rather allow a creative interplay to emerge 
from which arises the generation of new forms of knowledge (Miller 
[1995]: 190). According to Parkinson, «the analogy between the new 
painting and the new physics consists in that elements formerly held 
as cognitive or conceptual a-prioris enter as constitutive factors in the 
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very structure of the edifices of art and science» 
(Parkinson [2008]: 161). How exactly does it work? 
If for us nowadays it’s relatively easy to think of the 
mimetic moment of art as a prelude to geometry, it 
is not so trivial to claim how higher-order represen-
tational1 symbolic epistemic structures (h.o.r.s.e.s.) 
arise from the lifeworld (that is conceived as nec-
essarily art-laden), or simply how both interact 
together. The aim of this paper is to stake out of the 
complexity of processes going from the lifeworld 
and, before that, from the life of pictorial language, 
to h.o.r.s.e.s., in order to apply this model to further 
enquiries. In the first part, we will reactivate the 
Kantian interdependence between aesthetics and 
epistemology via the intersubjective dimension, in 
order to understand how the shaping of forms and 
the figuring-out patterns remain an essential com-
ponent of any epistemic structure as such. In the 
second part, moving from Hacking, Husserl and 
Foucault, we will look at the way the evidence of 
symbolic structures can be maintained alongside a 
genetic conception of science. Art plays an essential 
role in such a conception, in that it opens new hori-
zons of iconicity in which new shapes can arise and 
new kinds of objectivities (Gegenständlichkeiten) 
can be accepted as belonging to our epistemic expe-
rience of the world.  
1. AESTHETICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY: MOVING 
FROM KANT
1.1 Subject, community and shapes
In Epistemology, beyond a purely consensual 
theory of truth, a cognitive agent must be able to 
provide the evidence of his statements without 
external (cultural and anthropological) elements. 
That is also the idea of a transcendental theory of 
truth as presented by Kant in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. In this sense, the subject is alone, while 
having access to invariable forms and structures, 
which are able to shape the evidence for his claims 
of knowledge. 
1 On the vast topic of «representation» between art and 
science, see Chakravatty (2010).
The experience of beauty on the other hand, 
according to Kant, confirms the mutual link 
between the subject and the community (with its 
cultural and anthropological structures) by a sort 
of projection of agreement in the claim of valid-
ity for every aesthetic judgment (critically con-
sidered). The Other, a sort of immanent human 
transcendence, is present, even if the intersubjec-
tive community cannot be deduced by the sub-
ject of the claim itself. However, the discovery of 
intersubjectivity does not seem a roughly idealis-
tic process: the transcendental ideality of the open 
horizon of all judging subjects is to be found in 
the dynamical character of the capacity to judge, 
which acts without reducing the otherness of 
intersubjectivity to the subject (of knowledge). 
Such a reduction can be either psychologistically 
or metaphysically fashioned. According to Kant, 
on the contrary, intersubjectivity is necessary to 
the subject in order to be able to conceive itself. 
According to the claims of taste itself, subjectiv-
ity is decentralized, opened to something that is 
neither roughly psychological (association) nor 
metaphysical (as a sort of renewed monad). Due 
to such decentralization, the otherness of a com-
munity (historical but also merely synchronic) 
appears as a coessential (and therefore irreducible) 
for overcoming the monadism of the transcenden-
tal subject. Through the mirroring between self-
ness and intersubjective otherness, the dimension of 
historical knowledge emerges, not in the sense of 
a knowledge of history, but of a historically sedi-
mented knowledge shared with other subjects in a 
well-defined transcendental perspective. 
According to Kant, however, the opening of an 
intersubjective horizon first of all shows the pos-
sibility of grasping the potentially infinite richness 
of empirical experience (by which knowledge can 
be knowledge of something determinate rather 
than of purely physical principles). In other words, 
before giving access to any kind of history (natural 
history, human history and historical knowledge) 
to conceive an intersubjective otherness defines the 
relation between the epistemic agent and the expe-
rience of the natural world, as well as its codifica-
tion in a positive knowledge whatsoever. In this 
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sense the experience of beauty is only an exem-
plary moment. Coherently with the introduction 
to the Critique of Judgment, the principle defining 
the aesthetic subjectivity, or the aesthetic expe-
rience of subjectivity, i.e. finality, brings – so to 
speak – the Kantian philosophy from the idea of 
a merely mechanical system of nature to a richer 
idea of nature as a final system. From our per-
spective, that can be used as a thread for another 
inquiry: to show how the intersubjective manifold 
of art forms, in a well-determined age, will bridge 
the gap between two different ideas of knowledge 
and, thus, between two different world-images 
(Weltbilder). 
In both cases, we need not only to conceive 
nature as a pure structure of laws, that is, as an 
objectum purae matheseos (Descartes, AT VII: 71), 
and science as a mathesis pura atque abstracta, but 
to grasp both in their potentially endless empirical 
diversifications. First we have to shift to another, 
primordially rooted Nature, instead of holding on 
to the idea of nature as a sublimation of purely 
quantitative physical laws. Finality intervenes, 
according to Kant, precisely at the point where the 
Newtonian world of pure masses reveals itself only 
as a high speculative formalization of our way of 
experiencing it, i.e. as a natura formaliter spectata 
rather than as a natura materialiter spectata. Even 
if the purely relational schema of pure under-
standing could be sufficient ex principio, it deter-
mines a phenomenologically poor nature, that is, 
a nature without basis, just as the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science gives a very pecu-
liar idea both of natural science [Naturwissen-
schaft] and of science as such, viewed from the 
point of view of a systematic approach. 
The object, definable in its fundamental epis-
temic core as pure mass, needs to be experienced 
as form, that is, as a figure or as inherent to a fig-
ure; it needs to be figured out as shape, as Gestalt, 
in a mimetic process that is anything but inno-
cent. In order to be able to speak about nature, in 
order to be able to grasp nature in its potentially 
endless empirical determinations, our vision must 
be taught to figure-out shapes of things. According 
to Kant, once it is made entirely independent of 
any form of Psychologism, the process of figuring-
out shapes becomes a purely transcendental pro-
cess, even if not in the sense of the transcendental 
schematism of pure concepts of the understand-
ing. 
The implementation of the pure time-sche-
matism with the empirical schematism does not 
represent an extrinsic need for the aesthetic sub-
jectivity. By showing the strong dependence of the 
empirical experience on the capacity of our imagi-
nation to figure out shapes and patterns, Kant 
shows that our experience of the world cannot 
emerge without an intrinsically aesthetic opera-
tion. In a somewhat symmetrical way, the intrin-
sic intersubjective nature of aesthetic experience 
shows how our experience of the world, a world 
existing before and independently of the emer-
gence of higher-order formal categorizations, is 
linked to a practical dimension of life. The world 
of empirical experiences, as a «world in between», 
between knowing and agency, is a horizon of con-
tamination, hybridization, a sort of generative 
matrix of ways to figure-out shapes and patterns2. 
The ways of imitation are not only a pure passive 
ways of mirroring objects but a higher and more 
complex systemic process of our living, acting 
and understanding. In this world-in-between, the 
dimension of fusion and contamination does not 
unfold as a series of shocks between pure masses, 
but as encounters between individual entities, cul-
tures, shapes, sounds, gestures and so on.
The experience of beauty is the exemplary 
phenomenon of contamination, in which we can 
describe – from a transcendental point of view – 
the interaction between understanding, sensibil-
ity and imagination, the interaction between the 
subject and his community, the plastically open 
mirroring between the individual and the univer-
sal. The Deduction of the Judgments of Taste is the 
moment of the third Critique in which the uni-
versal capacity of figuring out shapes and patterns 
is linked with intersubjectivity. If the Analytic of 
Beauty alone was sufficient to legitimate the sta-
2 For the use of «generative matrix» cfr. Schnell (2019: 
chap. 5).
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tus of intersubjectivity, the Deduction not only 
makes explicit the implicit: the first nine of the 
twenty-five sections of the Deduction would have 
been sufficient for that. To make explicit not only 
the reference to a community tout court, but its 
grounds means precisely to show how that world 
of forms, the world in between, can be continually 
reconstituted and reformed.
The Deduction articulates the principle of 
finality as grounds for universal formativity, as 
a rule of figuring-out shapes and patterns, the 
moment in which the synergy between common 
sense (and intersubjectivity) and formal finality 
converges to the formation of new shapes. As early 
as the middle of the analytic of beauty, the com-
municability of pleasure and the free play between 
the understanding and the imagination were a sort 
of specular aspect of the same aesthetic dynamics: 
the ground of pleasure is the communicability of 
a sensation. The ground of communicability is the 
harmonic dynamic of the faculties. 
1.2 Shaping forms and figuring-out patterns
The free play by which imagination and 
understanding are aesthetically harmonized, that 
is oriented to a knowledge in general [für eine 
Erkenntnis überhaupt], determines – by the same 
operation of a figuring-out shapes and patterns – 
the immediate state of our experience. Between 
appearance of our world of pre-objective experi-
ence and objectification through epistemological 
frames, we can find the dimension in which and 
by which the manifold pre-predicatively is formed, 
becoming then a semantically consistent reality. 
Such a pre-categorial synthesis, defined by Kant as 
comprehensio aesthetica (Kant [1928]: 320), comes 
up in the Critique of Judgment as a «standard 
idea» (Kant [1790] § 17: 83).
The dynamics described here are not one of 
associative processes, that is, of personal psycho-
logical acts of figuring-out: «This standard idea 
is not derived from proportions that are taken 
from experience as determinate rules. Rather, it is 
in accordance with this idea that rules for judging 
become possible in the first place» (Kant [1790]: 
84). The emergence of an aesthetic idea as well as of 
a standard idea is empirically independent, because 
the faculty of the imagination itself to figure out 
shapes, i.e. normal ideas, is transcendental, that 
is: defines a condition of possibility [Möglichkeits-
bedingung]. It can recall signs for concepts, it can 
associate a sign to an empirical shape – that the 
imagination sketched by the description of the vis-
ual space – with an archetypal shape: the standard 
idea. The eidopoietic nature of imagination shows 
also the means by which we think of the empirical 
world analogically as an interconnected system of 
forms in mutual relation. According to the stand-
ard idea, the world as pre-predicative experience 
takes on a stable meaning; the neutral state of the 
subjective dimension also begins to take place in a 
world constituted by purely relational functions, but 
moreover begins to appear as its phenomenologi-
cal basic level. That what the imagination does in 
an absolutely dynamical natural way, i.e. to figure-
out shapes and patterns, is the process by which 
the imagination «projects a large number of images 
onto one another. By fixing the middle archetypal 
form of the object, it is the ground of every empiri-
cal conceptual representation» [Ibidem, 83]. The 
standard idea represents, so to speak, «the image 
that nature used as the archetype on which it based 
its productions within any one species» [Ibidem], 
and it is thus the source of the conceivability of 
nature. On an intuitive level, it is the archetype by 
which we can recognize an object, as this object. 
From the standard idea the capacity of judgment 
projects a sort of frame of regularity into the empir-
ical nature: even the roughest perception of a sim-
ple everyday object presupposes the identification, 
merely analogical but nonetheless essential, of an 
archetypal causality which is entirely heterogeneous 
with a deterministic system, the index of regular-
ity that inscribes the bare ontological singularity in 
a semantically consistent horizon of meanings and 
forms. Such a demand for stability, before to be for-
malized in a teleological principle for the Reason as 
objective finality, is at work basically in every sub-
jective experience. 
Even in the process of schematizing, the purely 
relational structure of transcendental determina-
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tions of time (transzendentale Zeitbestimmungen) 
needs, in order to be the experience of an indi-
vidual, another kind of schematizing. The faculty 
of judgment, either by the standard or the aes-
thetic idea, preserves that way of shaping forms 
from Psychologism and reveals it to be something 
transcendental, but in another way. The faculty of 
judgment allows us to recognize the identities and 
the differences between the real object, staked out 
by shaping its forms, and the concept. How, Kant 
seems to be asking, do we come to recognize in an 
empirical manifold a tree, a linden, independent-
ly of the fact that this something contains general 
ontological predicates? At the level of immediate 
perception, the subject receives an empirical man-
ifold that becomes the tree, the linden, only by 
shaping its form. 
What is this «certain something»? Its presence 
can no longer be purely determined by a transcen-
dental cognitive relation, that is a relation subsist-
ing between subject and pure manifold (the so-
called Gegenstand überhaupt). 
The access to a meaningful, semantically con-
sistent empirical world, is the free yet harmonic 
interplay between imagination and understand-
ing (Kant, [1790]: 159). Without such a process it 
would be impossible to have any empirical expe-
rience: the ego would be reduced to the experi-
ence of an anonymous world. The patterns and 
the consistency of our empirical world arise from 
the basic individuation of singularity, not as an 
ontological singularity, but as an empirical one. 
The individuation of singularity goes beyond the 
praesentia of a purely ontological complex of rela-
tions, and first emerges through naming some-
thing recognized as an empirical object. It is pre-
cisely at this point that Kant tries to overcome the 
dichotomy between mathesis and taxinomia as 
main presupposition of the science of the modern 
age. 
The relation between name and aesthetic idea 
serves as an index for the recognition of the expe-
rienced quid, as terminus a quo from which the 
imagination inscribes the anonymous ontologi-
cal quid in a semantic network: the function of 
any empirical scheme goes hand in hand with the 
capacity to link names to standard ideas (Capozzi, 
[1987]: 121). All of that resides outside a purely 
formal ontological process. The irreducible paral-
lelism between thought and language, language 
and nature (word and object), justifies and needs 
at the same time the intertwining of analogi-
cal thinking in order to codify everyday experi-
ence in its empirical dimension. If we had a sort 
of natural relationship between word and concept, 
as if words, not only names, had an already valid 
correspondence with things, we would have no 
need (in Kant’s view) of such analogical relations, 
and the faculty of judgment could play no role in 
determining our empirical experience. The fac-
ulty of judgment plays, on the contrary, an essen-
tial role by considering the constitutive semantic 
fluidity of our experience. How could we, upon a 
logical ground, infer a conceptual identity from 
the partial similarity of one thing to another?  It 
is impossible by syllogisms or by concepts. «What 
I see there and know is a linden!»: in order to 
utter such a judgment, in order to fix a full cor-
respondence between the shape of this tree, the 
monogram that my imagination has sketched, and 
the name – then the concept – must overlap, and 
therefore I can be able to judge what element per-
tains to the identification and what does not! The 
rough singularity of the thing must be trespassed 
towards the identity of the concept, because the 
concept is always universal (see Kant [1924], Refl. 
2866: 121), whereas the unnamed thing remains 
a bare individual. If the concept, as universal, can 
be applied to a potential infinity of cases, the jump 
that brings the naked singularity to the universal 
is neither purely empirical nor purely conceptual, 
but another kind of process, that is, an analogical 
one. 
In the case of analogical recognition, as with 
aesthetic representation, it is clear how only cer-
tain representational contents are such empirical 
determinations, inherent to the tree in front of 
us, but not all of them: only salient representa-
tions must be kept. Between the complex repre-
sentation of the singularity of something and the 
concept, a sort of shrewd reduction takes place by 
way of intentionally experienced abstraction, as 
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in a sketch drawn on paper, or in a mimic gesture 
or a melody. Could we abstract from Socrates in 
order to obtain his simple shape? We do that in 
every moment of our object-oriented experience! 
In Kant’s view, we do that through our produc-
tive imagination, educated by aesthetic experience, 
precisely at the moment when we name some-
thing with a common noun, such as: «Socrates is a 
man» or «that is a linden». The process of obtain-
ing that medium which serves as a common cri-
terion, as a common measure, is based upon the 
figuring-out of our imagination (see Kant [1923]: 
94; Kant [1966]: 270).
In order to be comparable, then in order to 
be inscribed within an epistemic or even proto-
epistemic framework, bare singularities first need 
to belong to a genus, to have a common noun. It 
would be meaningless to compare the linden on 
our right to the street lamp on our left, if not from 
a purely formal-ontological point of view. Mak-
ing clear the analogical processes which puts the 
subject in its relation to the manifold of empirical 
experience not only reveals a subjectivity which is 
constitutively rooted in a semantic framework of 
meanings and ordered processes, but above all, it 
reveals how the capacity to figure something out 
is the necessary condition of knowing, because 
knowing, before working in purely and norma-
tively formal (formalized) contexts, means being 
able to bring the singularity into a context, into a 
semantically concrete framework. This is provided 
aesthetically, according to Kant, by the capacity 
to judge, that is by finding shapes for a bare sin-
gularity. Such an aesthetic way of judging comes 
from a more disinterested activity of figuring-out 
shapes and patterns, that is, of figuring-out per se, 
without concerning oneself with reality, things or 
objects, but merely with the shaping of forms.
In this way, Kant presents - at the same time 
- a new approach to Art, even if the Critique of 
Judgment cannot be considered a treatise about 
philosophy of art. In other words, he shows a way 
to bring aesthetics and epistemology together in 
order to understand how everyday life depends 
on beauty above all else. In this sense, the basic 
epistemology of the real world depends on the 
experience of beauty in a broad sense, for only 
such experience can activate the essential predis-
position for receptivity to ideas, essential predis-
position to every relationship with the empiri-
cal dimensions of experience. For Kant, however, 
epistemology and science, in the traditional mean-
ing of scientia naturalis and historia naturalis, do 
not include within them a history. Their genesis, 
already existing and remaining in the background, 
tells us not about scientific revolutions or para-
digmatic crises, but merely about a progressive 
teleological description of nature itself. If, accord-
ing to Kant, the aesthetic (das Ästhetische) plays 
a central role in epistemology, its epistemology is 
precisely that, what must be questioned and criti-
cized. What the history of science has revealed is 
that, in fact, science, or the huge network of sci-
entific practices, is more differentiated than it may 
have seemed at the end of the eighteenth century. 
It would be very difficult to extend directly the 
claim of the central role of aesthetic experience on 
epistemology to that highly differentiated network 
of epistemic practices which, to this day, we still 
somewhat naively call science.
However, difficult does not mean impossible. 
The second part of this paper will evaluate pre-
cisely the possibility of such an extension, and the 
necessary clarification of its basic features, which 
results therefrom. 
2. FROM AESTHETIC TO SYMBOLIC 
STRUCTURES AND BACK
2.1 Passivity, lifeworld, and genetic processes
The question to be asked is no longer wheth-
er intersubjectivity (even as a common aesthetic 
sense) works as the cognitive component for eve-
ry subject, but whether subjectivity, as empirical 
and historically situated subjectivity, via inter-
subjectivity, works on the formation of h.o.r.s.e.s. 
What we should be asking, in other words, is a) 
whether there is a trace of the aesthetic working, 
or of some aesthetical transfiguration of reality, in 
higher-order symbolic structures of knowing, and 
b) whether these formations, or some of them, 
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work backwards to transform our aesthetic imagi-
nary life. 
At first sight, it seems obvious that there can 
be neither fusion nor contact between h.o.r.s.e.s. 
and the aesthetic element. As in a sort of dogma, 
we are oriented to consider the genesis of sym-
bolic mathematical, physical, biological epistemic 
structures, i.e. structures with a high rate of for-
malization of one or more regional ontologies, as 
entirely independent of the aesthetic, a dimension 
wherein beauty can work only from the point of 
view of the elegance of formalisms (the elegance 
of certain notations, some proofs and so on).
Such an approach is still essentially Kantian, 
at least from an epistemological point of view. The 
aesthetic dimension can, in the best-case scenario, 
play a role for the so-called soft sciences [Kraus 
(2011)] and, more generally, for those sciences 
which – at the time – precisely do not need higher 
levels of symbolic formalization. In this way, we still 
remain, so to speak, in that dichotomy sketched 
out by Foucault, according to which Taxinomia, or 
every complex element of our experience as well as 
of nature, cannot belong to the horizon of Mathe-
sis: the nature of the complex, or nature itself in its 
complexity, cannot contaminate the pure corpus of 
its mathematization (Foucault [1989]: 80).
Our thesis is, to the contrary, that the aesthetic 
element, the activity of figuring-out shapes and 
patterns and shaping new forms which seems pri-
ma facie to be entirely independent of the dimen-
sion of formality and formalisms, works in a com-
plex way at an ontogenetic as well as at a phylo-
genetic level, precisely by allowing new codes of 
representation to emerge. Such codes, in turn, 
allow for h.o.r.s.e.s. at the level of a high (if not the 
highest) rate of formalization. We have then to ask 
if, and in which way, the aesthetic dimension plays 
a central role in the formation and construction, 
but above all in the discovery, of new h.o.r.s.e.s. 
In this sense, the aesthetic dimension would be 
considered not only an origin of the receptivity 
to aesthetic ideas, but also a generative matrix of 
ideas and epistemic frames. 
How could the aesthetic dimension play such 
a central role? In order to answer this question, 
we have to take another step into the transcen-
dental dimension, more particularly by consid-
ering what the late transcendental phenomenol-
ogy of Edmund Husserl shows about the genesis 
and emergence of logically symbolic structures as 
such. As many scholars since Derrida have point-
ed out, Husserl is the first to elaborate a genetic 
non-psychologistic theory of the emergence of 
logical structures from passivity, in Experience 
and Judgement, and of epistemic structures from 
the lifeworld, in the Crisis of the European Sciences 
(Husserl [1970]: 27-28).
The importance of such elaboration within 
ruled genetic analysis cannot be underestimated, 
first of all for all historical epistemology, as such. 
In order to sketch out the problem of such a ver-
tical (bottom-up) conception of the emergence of 
theoretical structures, it will suffice to focus on 
three points:
1. There is, at the proto-dimension of passivity, 
a sort of continuum of shapes that shade into one 
other and are conceivable «at any level of general-
ity». While maintaining his radical anti-psycholo-
gism (developed after Frege’s criticism of his Phi-
losophy of Arithmetic and made stable by the idea 
of categorical intuition in the sixth Logical Inves-
tigation), a genetic perspective on the emergence 
of theoretical structures admits that it is possible 
(and necessary) to think of a bottom-up process 
wherein shapes, at any level, have to be considered 
from the point of view of their logical stability. 
The process of ideation, or the process of emer-
gence through ideation, does not deny the stability 
and autonomy of a shape at the level of formaliza-
tion. The question is, how are we to think of such 
a verticality of genesis?
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2. At the point of the passive proto-dimension, 
that is, before it has been objectified, a shape can-
not receive any kind of intersubjective determina-
bility, i.e. it cannot be «communicable to everyone 
in its determinations» . The question is: does such 
an inscription in communicability, in relation to 
our previous analysis of Kant, still remain purely 
theoretical, or does it need, at least in some cases, 
a sort of aesthetic transformation?
3. To take genesis as a bottom-up emergence 
of shapes for granted, whilst leaving open the 
possibility of a better understanding of the emer-
gence itself, we have to consider what happens in 
the transition between the anonymous dimension 
of shapes, communicability, and the emergence of 
a formal level as such. Does such a process have 
something to do with Kant’s conception of shaping 
forms and figuring-out?
The answer to the third question is positive. 
Indeed, if we consider what Husserl says about 
the process, we find more than analogies with the 
process described by the Critique of Judgement, 
but with some important modifications. He says 
that «measuring is only the end stage » of a longer, 
more deeply rooted process, meaning that, start-
ing from the proto-passive dimension wherein 
shapes are embedded in a continuum, the cogniz-
ing ego begins to describe «bodily shapes of rivers, 
mountains, buildings» which, as a rule, is inde-
pendent of names and concepts. It means that, just 
as for the normal idea, we have to inscribe that 
form in an intersubjective horizon wherein the 
shape, in order to be «determinable, and commu-
nicable in its determinations, to everyone» must 
be conferred an elementary linguistic sign. 
We find here a sort of symmetry breaking in 
the pre-categorial experience of a shape and the 
exit from the continuum of shapes, in order to 
enter into another continuum, namely the dimen-
sion of the lifeworld. It is clear that passivity and 
the lifeworld are not the same (Staiti [2018]). The 
lifeworld means intersubjectivity and represents a 
higher level than pure passivity. In this sense, the 
emergence from the (undifferentiated) continuum 
of shapes and the inscription in the lifeworld as 
an intersubjective (multi-dimensional) horizon 
signifies an inscription of shapes in a radically 
new topology (Husserl [2008]: 112-118), wherein 
regions are mapped out and rooted in a sort of 
fibration with each other. Becoming a name, and 
then a sort of link with an ideality (joined togeth-
er with other idealities), the pictured similarity 
would be taken out of its constitutive anonymity 
and laid open to further determinations: not only 
the determination of position, but every deter-
mination including all further idealization, to the 
point where the original shape is no longer recog-
nizable as a pictured similarity as such, but is sub-
limated.
According to Husserl’s genetic theory of sci-
ence, the inscription of a shape in the horizon of 
the lifeworld, even if such horizon is characterized 
by its multi-dimensionality, need not encounter 
the aesthetic dimension, as it were. The fact that 
the aesthetic was never an important topic for 
Husserl, is proven by the fact that he completely 
misunderstood, or else ignored (Uzelac [1998]), 
the importance of the aesthetic dimension in 
understanding the fixing of shapes at the level of 
the lifeworld.
Such a misunderstanding goes hand in hand 
with a linear bottom-up conception of genesis, as 
if genesis were a sort of vertical ascent through 
the power of ideation, that is, with the radical 
misunderstanding of how the aesthetic dimen-
sion is essential to the constitution of an inter-
subjective community as such. If that is coherent 
with some of Husserl’s basic assumptions about 
ontology, in particular concerning regional ontol-
ogies, it is precisely because such assumptions 
limit the interpretative power of such a theory of 
science. For Husserl, although in radical opposi-
tion to the ontological monism of Carnap and 
logical positivism, ontological pluralism is fixed, 
not dynamically conceived (Pradelle [2010]). 
The fixed relationship among different regions 
of experience, as a partition of the lifeworld, 
make it so that there is no way to think of any 
hybridization of motives bringing to some high-
er genesis of concepts and idealities or other. In 
this sense: from the lifeworld, that which is natu-
ral remains natural (as formalized in the natural 
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sciences), that which is human remains human 
(as formalized – not too highly! – in the social 
sciences or anthropology) and so on. The ques-
tion for us, then, is not merely whether or not, 
according to Husserl, the aesthetic could become 
a well-defined regional ontology (in this case it 
will remain a flat ontology without higher forms 
of symbolization), but whether such a conception 
of the lifeworld per se is still affordable. To think 
of the lifeworld, i.e. the multi-dimensional hori-
zon of our experience, as a tiling wherein region-
al ontologies are tiles, is not only anachronistic 
but also partially conflicts with the very assump-
tion of a multi-dimensional lifeworld. 
From the same perspective, it is anachronistic 
to think that skipping from the dimension of pas-
sivity to the dimension of communicability does 
not imply a sort of aesthetic transformation. The 
pictured similarity (a vestige of a sort of Aristote-
lian psychology, «imago in phantasia depicta») is 
far from being an element of our lifeworld, just as 
a pictorial work is far from a simply passive copy 
of something belonging to the same lifeworld. 
As Foucault shows, naming and names are no 
pitches on objects but carriers of the complex-
ity of our living in cultures, with religious, icono-
graphical codes (and systems of power).3 Nam-
ing (according also to Quine [1969]) is not a 1-1 
operation but an instantiation of a discursive 
order. So inscription, through communicability, 
in the multidimensional horizon of the lifeworld, 
cannot at first be thought of as a non-active trans-
formation, as if we were dealing with an inventory 
of things by naming. Such a consideration would 
take us too far. It is sure that once conceived the 
difference between the proto-dimension of passiv-
ity and the multidimensional horizon of lifeworld, 
to conceive the bottom-up process as linear and 
purely vertical is simply and roughly dogmatic. 
Communicability and aesthetic transformation 
are almost synonymous, because what we come to 
see through naming is not only a pictured simi-
larity but a sort of anthropological concretion 
3 A satisfactory introduction to this topic can be found in 
Vom Bruck & Bodenhorn (2009).
of meaning which allows us to grasp the named 
thing or phenomenon as something else, some-
thing belonging precisely to our lifeworld. That 
breaks the linearity of any bottom-up process 
passing through the lifeworld and going to gener-
ate h.o.r.s.e.s. Hence, the passage through the life-
world breaks the linearity of the genetic process 
because its anthropological as well iconographic 
depth works as a prism. 
As a prism deviating and refracting a ray of 
light, the lifeworld, through its anthropological as 
well iconographic depth, deviates and refracts the 
genesis from the pre-predicative to a high level of 
symbolic formalization. 
In this sense, Benjamin understood more 
deeply the strong relationship not only between 
art and languages, but also between art and the 
lifeworld. Art is the language of the lifeworld more 
than any other human factor (Benjamin [1979]: 
122).
2.2 Emergence, non-linearity and complexity
If we apply this conception of visual lan-
guages4 as co-essential to the lifeworld as such, 
we can use it as a method for implementing both 
Husserl’s and Foucault’s conceptions, in order to 
think epistemologically the genesis of h.o.r.s.e.s.. 
According to Husserl, using the genetic perspec-
tive but aesthetically implemented, we can claim 
that the aesthetic element of the lifeworld per-
forms or works actively and genetically bottom-
4 On the topic of visual culture and visual language, see 
Mirzoeff (2001).
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up, but not linearly and not bound by any disci-
pline (that is, within a rigid structure of regional 
ontologies). According to Foucault, the dimen-
sion of intersubjectivity is not neutral, but rather a 
sort of generative matrix of individuation (at first) 
and the emergence of idealities. To put it differ-
ently, the genetic process of h.o.r.s.e.s. is complex, 
that is «a tissue (comlplexus means «what is tossed 
together») of heterogeneous inseparably associated 
constituents», «a tissue of events, actions, interac-
tions, retroactions, determinations, fringes, that 
constitute our phenomenal world» (Morin [2005]: 
21). Historic approaches to great civilizational 
processes, such as the rise of Greek culture (from 
which, properly speaking, emerges «the idea» of 
science, epistêmê, as we know it), have already 
touched and analytically considered such implica-
tion of motives on the basis of which we can talk 
about a complex evolution. 
If «art shows an unlimited capacity of spir-
itual communication» (Jaeger [1986]: 65), it 
is precisely because – as an essentially forma-
tive medium – it lies between the proto-logical 
dimension of passivity, what Jaeger calls «the 
sensible evidence of real life», and the concep-
tual dimension of ideation, that is, «philosophy 
and reflection». Our thesis is that the invention 
and construction of h.o.r.s.e.s. must necessarily 
be not «context-independent» but context-sen-
sitive and articulated according to a constantly 
operating semantic generative matrix. This must 
happen from an ontogenetic, as well as a phylo-
genetic point of view. The thesis is not psycholo-
gistic because it is not a question of presenting 
a sort of psychological analysis of the making of 
art or the doing of science, but an analytically 
strong interpretation of changes in science fol-
lowing the perspective of historic epistemology 
from Kuhn to Hacking. The nodes of the genetic 
emergence of h.o.r.s.e.s., from proto-passivity to 
formalization, necessarily pass through real life, 
and will be refracted, if not oriented, by a sen-
sibility lying at the basis of our real life, an aes-
thetic sensibility to the world. Art, we might say 
according to Jaeger, «is more philosophical than 
real life but it is also more full of life than philo-
sophical knowledge, thanks to its concentrated 
spiritual reality».
Two possible objections to this thesis are 1) 
that we cannot apply the method of complex emer-
gence analysis to well-defined structures, and 2) 
that we fall, if not into a form of Psychologism, 
then into cultural Relativism à la Foucault. That 
would mean that, with respect to any superficial 
reading of The Archeology of Knowledge, we will 
lose touch with the evidence of our science, or of 
our scientific claims because, in fine, everything 
is cultural. But that is not the case, due to the 
complementarity between the phenomenologic-
transcendental approach, which admits, as anti-
psychologistic factor, an ever-stable categorical 
«intuition» of idealities, and Foucault’s approach, 
which brings back, so to speak, the singularity of 
a conceptual element or node of a scientific com-
plex network to the discursive order of that net-
work as such. The key of a complex interpretation 
of some formation of h.o.r.s.e.s. must be found 
beyond all cultural relativism (for every single sci-
entific claim). It arises from, and belongs to, both a 
certain discursive field (Foucault) and to an order of 
experience (Husserl).
There is neither a mere discursive order with-
out stabilities, syntactic invariances of highly for-
malized epistemic experience, nor a mere order of 
experience without paradigmatic, intersubjective 
and culturally established invariances and sali-
ences of every claim. By complementing Husserl 
with Foucault and vice versa, we can affirm that a 
certain claim is statically stable from the point of 
view of evidence (because evidence, in the form 
of categorical intuition for h.o.r.s.e.s., arises sim-
ply from the directly underlying level) and geneti-
cally open, that is, unstable, because it depends on 
a wider network of concepts, the discursive order, 
constantly evolving. 
If, from a genetic point of view, a h.o.r.s.e.s., 
even very distant from the empirical experi-
ence, still genetically depends on the dimension 
of the lifeworld and the historical bifurcations of 
genetic processes from the point of view of the 
evidence and theoretical stability of a new syn-
tactically higher formalized level, what provides 
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stability (then possibility) to evidence, is the local 
categorical pertinence with the directly underly-
ing level5. 
But if, as we (at least) should, we consider a 
theory or a branch of a theory as a complex net-
work, firstly per se (fig. 5a), and secondly in its 
constant concrete relation to the lifeworld and 
to the experience (fig. 5b) instead of relativizing 
evidence, such a general interpretive framework 
allows us to relativize monistic conceptions of sci-
ence affected by a dangerous misunderstanding. 
For example, the very dangerous misunderstand-
ing of a single origin (closer to biblical tales than 
to science): the origin of geometry, the origin of 
physics, the origin of biology or the origin of sci-
ence6.
5 A analysis of the layered structure of categorical intui-
tion was presented by Lohmar (1989: 70-102). For a 
genetic approach to mathematics in this way, Fraisopi 
(2012: 33-78).
6 For a other approach to science, as modular instead of 
architectonic-axiomatic systems, cfr. Dupré (1983) and 
Cartwright (1999).
2.3 Origin, rebirths and feedbacks
The complexity of scientific processes as 
human processes and their constant relation to the 
lifeworld, prevents us from speaking about abso-
lute singularities. For example, counter to Husserl, 
it will be more useful according to Michel Serres 
to speak of many or multiple origins of geometries: 
«La mathématique n’a donc pas été une fois, et ceci 
à tout jamais, en situation d’origine» (Serres [2001]: 
25). Such multiple recurrent or resilient situations 
of origin mean simply a reactivation of the relation-
ship with the lifeworld and often with the lifeworld 
as aesthetic dimension. If we consider phyloge-
netically, from an historical point of view, many 
phases of creativity in science, if not revolutions, 
we notice that they have been filtered by aesthetic 
dimensions. By affirming the complexity of genetic 
processes of h.o.r.s.e.s. and their emergence from 
a lifeworld, it becomes possible not only to avoid 
52 Fausto Fraisopi
the question «what comes first, the chicken or the 
egg?», but to analyze some cases from another 
point of view. Let us consider, for example, the so-
called origin of geometry in the Greeks. The myth 
of a single origin, the search only for a single ele-
ment in order to explain complex phenomena, 
should be abandoned once and for all. Where does 
Geometry or Mathematics come from? Field meas-
urement, bookkeeping, religion (as in the Indian 
civilization) or whatever else, conceived as unique 
origin, are all simplistic answers. What came first, 
agronomy, the religious cult, or art? From an his-
torical point of view, every single element, as part 
of a complex intersubjective horizon, cannot be, 
separately taken, a satisfying answer. 
The Greek temple, as a symbol of Greek archi-
tecture, is not only a building, but like cathe-
drals in the middle ages, a sort of instantiation 
of knowledge7. But before any cathedrals or what 
have you, the Greek temple made clear how art 
and science could melt together. The very mean-
ing of temple, templum, tèmenos, represents the 
first original topological partition between sacred 
and profane life. In this sense, art and religion are 
what first open up the space of such things as the 
epistemic as such: why is the Greek temple built 
according to the golden proportion? Why does 
geometry find a place in the temple itself? The 
sacred space, as a normative partition between 
the inner and the outer, between two dimensions, 
and as a dimension of normativity itself, allows, in 
the sense of an epiphany, geometric structures to 
appear as belonging to the dimension of norma-
tivity of the world of appearances. In this sense, 
art is not only a vehicle for science, but that which 
allows science to make sense, opening the topo-
logical outer space of normativity (but inner space 
of sacred life) wherein the irregular dimension 
of phenomenal life must be mirrored in order to 
become a stabilized meaning.
The same situation of origin can be seen in the 
late middle ages and at the beginning modernity, 
7 In this sense, Malvezzi (2018), Coldstream (1977), Sch-
weitzer, (1971). For a closer approach to geometric pro-
portions in Greek temples, Leonardis (2016).
when we have no evidence of a single factor deter-
mining the rebirth of algebra and mathematics, as 
well physics and astronomy (Fraisopi, 2016). The 
method of central perspective, for example, not 
only works as a model for the cogito (Horn, 2000), 
but above all perspective means a new way to con-
ceive mathematics and physics themselves as for-
mal determinations of nature in science. The same 
could be said for botany (that is, biology) and 
illustrating: what comes before? The answer will 
necessarily be simplistic, because the question is 
simplistic too (Lüthy, Smets [2009]).
If, on the contrary, we think of a sort of feed-
back, it is enough to think back to the avant-
gardes of the early twentieth century. Instead of 
being considered, as at the beginning, with both 
ridicule and admiration, we have to look inside, or 
through, the cubist or the futurist art in order to 
see what radical counter-effect the deconstruction 
of the Euclidian idea of space and the relativiza-
tion of geometry has upon art and common sense. 
People have not always understood the intentions 
of cubist artists, and they received this new art 
with much confusion. While it will undeniably 
always be remembered as a revolutionary turn-
ing point in the history of art for its endeavors 
to break away from the traditional rules of paint-
ing, which had ruled for more than five hundred 
years, Cubism ultimately represented the artists’ 
preoccupations with new systems of conception 
and new understandings of spatial structure. As 
Stephen Kern puts it simply, «then, it was under 
the impact of the Impressionists, Cézanne and the 
Cubists that the perspectival world broke up as if 
an earthquake had struck the precisely reticulat-
ed sidewalk of a Renaissance street scene.» [Kern 
[1983]: 140]. The modernists completely rewrote 
the rules of painting and opened up the way to 
every single movement of abstract art that fol-
lowed cubism. Space was no longer the same in 
the early twentieth century, and it was up to every 
student of nature, regardless of their discipline, to 
uncover the newly discovered mysteries of these 
higher realms of existence beyond the visible 
world. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Such case studies can ultimately show, start-
ing from the assumption of the complexity of 
scientific processes, that there is no aseptically 
defined, decisive division between art and the 
sciences except contamination (again and again, 
immer wieder), and that epistemology, as a study 
not focused solely on the object-oriented proposi-
tions of science, but on science as a complex sys-
tem or as a network of complex systems, must 
consider the fringe of science-making instead of 
object-oriented propositions, precisely in order 
to understand what makes it so that the orienta-
tion toward objects simply changes. Why does 
science recognize the need and possibility of 
admitting new entities into science? If it is impos-
sible to claim that the aesthetic dimension deter-
mines or orientates the syntactical consistency of 
h.o.r.s.e.s., without falling into a cultural relativ-
ism (à la Foucault), it would be relevant to claim 
that the aesthetic dimension works precisely in 
the predisposition to accept new semantic entities, 
i.e. new kinds of objects, events, states of affairs, 
as new ontological dimensions. It is the need for 
science, or for great advances in science, to figure 
out new situation of origins, to think, to figure out 
new ontological dimensions even if they are seem-
ingly contradictory with a) sensible experiences, 
and b) the accepted (already dominant) ideology 
or worldview (Weltbild) resulting from overlap-
ping sensible experiences and previously estab-
lished h.o.r.s.e.s. Only by working the figuring-out 
shapes and form, that is the aesthetical dimen-
sion of the lifeworld, does art open up new hori-
zons of figurativity. In this sense, we can affirm 
that through the art-working or through the evo-
lution of the aesthetic dimension, a virtuous cir-
cle between our lifeworld and the dimension of 
knowledge emerges, which is every time instanti-
ated in the opening up of new horizons for seeing 
and considering the phenomenal world itself. 
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